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A Study of the Formative Factors in the Free Trade
Agreement between Oman and the United States
Global North, Global South, First World, Third World, Developed Nations,
Developing Nations, no matter what label one uses, the fact that there is a clear divide
between the rich and poor nations of the world remains the same. For generations, great
thinkers and great states have proposed their own theories to bridge this gap. From the
capitalist theories of America and Western Europe, to the collectivist theories of Marx, Lenin,
and Mao, to the Flying Geese of a once-booming Japan, all of these theories have proven to
be effective only in remote, ideal conditions. Meanwhile, the majority of the world’s people
still live in economic despair.
A faint glimmer of hope rises from the Southeastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula.
Four decades ago, the Sultanate of Oman was an economic black-hole. Mired in a civil war
reminiscent of modern African conflicts and lacking any national motivation, Oman has since
found its stride in a most impressive way. Today, Oman ranks highly in nearly all of the
quality of life statistics and is increasingly financially solid. While this progress has been
undeniably aided by the discovery of significant oil deposits within the Sultanate, it has been
the prudent management of its natural resources and careful control of the internal
development that has allowed Oman to blossom. Oman stands as a new developmental
model for those countries in Africa and South America that find themselves resource-wealthy
(which many are far beyond Oman’s small reserves) but lacking in unity and security.
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A. Economic Background
Globalization is a force that is affecting us all. No aspect of society, from religion to
sport, has been untouched by its powers. The one aspect that arguably has been influenced
the most is economics. Over the last couple hundred years, since the invention of modern
economic science by Adam Smith, the world has witnessed an explosion of wealth and ideas.
For thousands of years, international trade was the sum total of money or barter received
from the sale of a ship or caravan’s cargo in a foreign land. Today, billions of dollars change
hands everyday without the need for a single transfer of goods. Along the way, the concepts
of power, statehood, and sovereignty have each blurred and shifted.
Economic History
When the Treaty of Westphalia established the modern system of nation-state
sovereignty, power was focused on the tip of a sword. Literally, the stronger a state’s armed
forces and defense structure, the stronger international position it held. Only rare geographic
exclusions, such as the natural boundary that the Alps provide for Switzerland, allowed states
to survive without military prowess or a tightly knit system of military alliances. States that
engaged in extraterritorial trade did so only when they could provide adequate force to
protect their investments. Ideas such as foreign ownership of property or industry were not
even formed. With the Industrial Revolution and the accompanying development of
advanced forms of transit, production, and communication, came entirely new views on the
role of the state.
Upon its introduction, capitalism took the world by storm. What started out as an
advancement of the barter system soon became a world order. Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels wrote in their famous 1848 Manifesto, “[Capitalism] compels all nations, on pain of
extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it
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calls civilization into their midst 1 .” As capitalism itself developed across the Western world,
it began to cross borders. Trade became simpler and more beneficial between states that
shared a common capitalist ethos. In good capitalist fashion, governments realized that they
could vastly increase their national treasuries by extracting import and export taxes on goods
and services.
Thanks to their superior military capabilities, and in large part due to the diseases they
carried, the Western powers and their capitalist system soon became a major force on the
world scene. However, the power of purely military means began to degrade as trade
continued its exponential development. Alan Oxley described the shift as,
Nations needed military power to exert influence and security was achieved
through military alliances. In the second half of the twentieth century another
system of relationships with rules governing international relationships has
emerged. These are economic commonwealths—free communities where
governments align their economic interests on neoliberal principles to advance
the common good. 2
Power now began to concentrate around economic ability. Growing ties between world
economies, through individual investments as well as government relations, led to what is
now known as economic interdependence. This in effect means that the healths of foreign
economies are directly linked to one another. To take this one step further, poor economic
policies in one country would not lead to a collapse in that country alone, but in every
country tied to it.
This new reality has led some to believe that the end of the nation-state as we know it
is nigh. They believe that military power is obsolete because countries cannot afford to ruin
their own economy by attacking another’s. However, this theory has not come to pass, nor
will it anytime soon. Military might is still a powerful tool (evidence America’s recent
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interests—the case of Australia.” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 1,
pp. 165–186, EBSCO Publishing, 2003.
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invasion of Iraq) and politics is still the mouthpiece of the government in most cases. Yet
economics has wedged its way in as the actual nuts and bolts of most working
intergovernmental relationships. In some cases, economics offers an arena for engagement
that is impossible for politics. Take for example the relationship between Taiwan and
mainland China. Taiwan no longer holds a seat in the United Nations and China does not
officially recognize them. However, both are full members of the World Trade Organization
and are able to use that forum to keep dialogue open and avoid armed conflict. 3
Economic Liberalization
The method for opening, or liberalizing, a state’s economy is by no means formulaic.
Some international economic organizations, especially lending organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), believe that modernizing and opening an economy
should be done the same way everywhere. In the case of the IMF, this is through the
maintenance of balanced budgets. But in this same case, what has caused economic gains for
some countries has resulted in other countries shirking on needed budgetary expenditures in
order to meet IMF requirements. The results are sometimes disastrous. It is also fictitious
that political pressure from developed nations will force developing countries along a
‘proper’ path.
Rather, the answer must lie within each developing country. Arvid Lukauskas and
Susan Minushkin published an examination of different styles of market opening among
middle-income states. They studied Turkey, Mexico, South Korea and Chile, and the results
were varied and quite revealing. Countries that were already financially stable (low budget
and fiscal deficits and international debts) were able to resist international pressure to open
their economies with greater ease. Their financial markets opened slowly to both capital
inflows and outflows, at a pace more closely dictated by the domestic government than any
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other influence. The same is true for countries that have more to bargain with. For example,
South Korea’s geostrategic position allowed it much greater bargaining latitude than Mexico.
On the flip side of the coin, countries that find themselves in dire need of capital are more
vulnerable to the whims of lending institutions and states. The most evident example of this
is Turkey, which after running up huge debts and budget deficits, coupled with astounding
inflation rates, was forced to comply with the liberalization demands of the IMF, the
European Economic Community, and many others in order to qualify for their aid. The result
was an accelerated opening of its financial sectors to all interested trading partners. Finally,
it was shown that countries with greater political stability were able to keep tighter control of
the exit of capital. Where weak governments ruled, they were more susceptible to the desires
of powerful corporations within their own country. 4
Modern Trade Pacts
Meanwhile, the role of economic relations is increasing daily. This growth is easily
recognized; “by the end of September 2001, 239 regional trade agreements (RTAs) had been
notified to GATT, or its successor the World Trade Organization (WTO). Of those
agreements, 100 have been notified since the creation of the WTO in 1995.” 5 Regional
conglomerations began to form such as the European Union, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN.
Above all else, these international organizations afforded their member states the strength of
numbers. No single European country can compete head-to-head with the gargantuan United
States economy; but, together, the European Union presents a much more formidable
opponent, be it in conflict or friendly negotiation. Small countries, to gain a measure of
influence on larger trading partners and adversaries alike, also often use membership in trade
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agreements. Similar to old military alliances, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements have
become a form of protection of identity.
A recent example of this can be found in the Free Trade Agreement between Jordan
and the United States. Jordan has a very small economy with very little to offer the U.S.
However, they were eager to exploit the obvious political ramifications of a closer
relationship with the superpower. 6 Along the same lines, Egypt has been pursuing a Free
Trade Agreement with the United States. In Egypt, the belief is held that “an agreement
could spur measures to further liberalize the domestic economy and integrate into the world
economy 7 ,” strengthening the web of interdependence as a protective barrier for both itself
and the U.S.
The world powers also have a keen interest in this developing system of trade
agreements. While their economies for the most part are comparatively already open, the
establishment of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) adds a new dimension to any
diplomatic relationship. A bilateral FTA removes the barriers to trade (import/export taxes,
quotas, tariffs, etc.) between two nations. It also offers a unique chance for the two countries
to adjust each other’s trade practice and corresponding legal procedures to better facilitate
cooperation. Next to their larger cousins (regional or multilateral trade agreements) bilateral
FTA’s are faster, as FTA agreements require less time than trade liberalization
under the WTO. The Uruguay round, which was the last round of multilateral
trade negotiations held under GATT, was initially scheduled to be completed
in four years, but it actually took nearly eight years, almost twice as long as
projected. One reason why the talks became so protracted was the sheer
volume of items to be negotiated, but in addition, the expansion in the number
of participating nations also had a major impact. 8
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Bilateral FTA’s are also able to cover topics that have not yet been resolved in more
comprehensive economic bodies such as the WTO. Significantly, they often attract less
public attention than their larger counterparts.
Short-Term Effects of Free Trade
Free Trade Agreements are not all sunshine and happiness though. For many
domestic workers, their country’s signing of an FTA could spell the end of their current
employment. The economic sense behind free trade is rooted in the idea of comparative
advantage. Briefly, comparative advantage posits that certain economies are better suited to
handle different kinds of production. Therefore, by each area specializing on what they are
best at and trading for those that they are relatively poor at producing, all will pay a lower
price for everything. Free trade simply removes barriers to this activity and allows areas to
truly play to their comparative advantages. Unfortunately, the perfect world that this would
work in does not exist. Centuries of self-sufficiency theories based on survival in a militarily
hostile world have created economies that produce products regardless of the higher cost
inflicted by not specializing. While in the long run it may be true that absolute specialization
without barriers to trade will result in better living conditions for all, the short run is a very
different picture.
Lower-cost producers from foreign countries immediately target domestic producers
that were previously protected by high import barriers. With an FTA in effect, these
economically inefficient companies are quickly demolished by outside competition. While in
economic formulas this looks neat, painless, and amoral, it really means entire local
economies will be erased. For evidence of this, all one needs to do is look at the huge
numbers of jobs lost when electronics giants RCA and Zenith went out of business in
America. Even more worrying is to attempt to imagine the havoc reeked in Detroit if the
United States were to stop protecting the domestic automobile industry.
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For economists, these local tragedies are a sad necessity for the greater good. For
those involved, they spell dire straits, sometimes for multiple generations until respecialization (through education) occurs and new industry grows. For the politicians that
represent the effected areas, a fine line must be walked. Representative politicians are in the
awkward position of having the expert advice that explains the benefits of free trade sparring
with the knowledge that the people who are responsible for their paycheck are being faced
with losing their own. In America, this has led to a partisan divide that deals less with the
true issues than with the ever-present battle for control in Washington, D.C. The opposing
party in the next elections immediately targets politicians that vote against their party’s line
or waver on their personal convictions. 9 Due to this, many countries with elected or
otherwise popularly vulnerable governments are much more deliberate in their consideration
of new trade agreements.
B. Omani Background
The Sultanate of Oman presents a unique case study. The Gulf region, with its
massive petrochemical wealth, has given rise to the “rentier” state. In its ideal form,
The rentier state concept is that while in ‘normal’ countries the state is
supported by society, and must, in order to pay for itself, establish a system to
extract from society part of the surplus the latter generates; in oil exporting
countries the state is paid by the oil rent, which accrues to it directly from the
rest of the world, and supports society through the distribution or allocation of
this rent, through various mechanisms of rent circulation. 10
In the real world, this means that states like the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman are
able to rule tax-free. Citizens of rentier states have no responsibility to support their
government, and therefore no claim to a stake in it. As well, the welfare regimes that
inevitably develop within rentier states create a popular dependency on the state. Within
Oman, this welfare state is alive and well, but the rentier state model is not quite applicable.
9
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28-29.
10
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The Rentier State Model
While in its original, theoretical definition, Oman is the model rentier state, once one
begins to examine the commonplace actions of rentier governments, the differences quickly
become apparent. The starkest break from the rentier model comes in the economic
development of Oman. In a typical rentier state, the economic independence of the
government allows it to pursue economic development in the style and pace of its choosing.
Quite the opposite takes place in Oman where
Unlike other rentier states where the traditional elites (mainly the merchant
class) have lost political power and were limited to accruing profits, in
Oman…the traditional elite actually saw an increase in its political power
following the coup of 1970. 11
There appear to be three main reasons for this: “the personal inclination of [Sultan] Qaboos,
the existing private sector (that had developed over centuries of sultanic interest in allowing
wealthy merchants to handle economic affairs), and the tribal tradition of autonomy.” 12 In
fact, each of these factors plays a large role in current economic development and deserves
individual examination.
Sultan Qaboos
Sultan Qaboos has quite possibly set a new benchmark for the role of the benevolent
monarch. While the impact of large oil revenues on his financial budget cannot be ignored,
they can be put in perspective by viewing a country such as Libya, with far larger oil wealth
and far less to show for it. Omani progress can be directly tied to the Sultan’s inspirational
vision and seemingly boundless will to progress his country. When Qaboos took the reigns
of power from his father Said bin Taimur in 1970, the country was mired in a civil war,
nearly bankrupt (although, notably, Said had managed to erase Oman’s foreign debt), and
almost entirely closed off to the outside world. Many Omani still remember the days when
11
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12
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the old gates of the capital city were locked at night, and not to keep people out. During his
reign Oman has progressed
From 3 small primary school, Oman now has 600,000 children in the
classroom, and English is required from Grade One; from an American
missionary-run 12 bed hospital, Oman is now recognized by UNICEF as
providing among the best primary health care in the world. 13
All of this, plus the successful end of the civil war, the establishment of agreed-upon borders
with all of its neighbors, and much more, has occurred in only 36 years. In addition, Sultan
Qaboos has introduced an extremely effective means of dealing with dissent, inclusion.
Rather than publicly humiliate or punish his opponents and detractors, to the greatest extent
possible he has opened dialogue with them and often offered them prestigious positions
within his own administration. By including adversaries, he gives them a share of the
responsibility for Oman’s proper governance, and avoids festering conflicts.
Private Sector
Oman also has a long history of foreign trade and economic interactions. On the
winds of the monsoon, Omani sailors traveled from the Far East to the southeast reaches of
Africa. During their first golden age, “Omanis were the head of the Foreign Traders
Committee in the Port of Shanghai in the 11th and 12th centuries.” 14 They maintained a
sizable empire until the 19th century. Merchant families dominated this rich history of
foreign trade. While the Sultan always played a role in economic affairs, it was historically
as the head of the wealthy Al-Bu Sa’id family and not as the overarching authority. Other
families, most notably still-existing Indian and Baluchi families such as the Khimji Ramdas
family, played just as large of roles. This effect was multiplied by Sultan Taimur bin Faisal,
who was uninterested in being Sultan, and the late years of Said bin Taimur when he lost his
interest and passion for ruling. During these times, the merchant families controlled nearly
13
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14
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all functions of state economy. With Sultan Qaboos’ desire for inclusion of all potentially
opposing elements, these merchants’ families were allowed to maintain much of their
influence in economic matters.
Tribal System
There is also a very strong tribal tradition in Omani history as well as the present day.
Originally, tribes were the main social structure. They played a large role in the working
lives as “occupational patterns were closely linked to the tribe, in the type of activity pursued
as well as the location.” 15 The tribal tradition was strengthened by the recent rule of the
Imamate in the interior of Oman and the role of Ibadhi Muslim politics that is central to
nearly everything Omani. From Ibadhism comes a strong tradition of democratic rule and
participatory government. Had Qaboos attempted to shunt the power of the tribes directly, he
surely would have faced continuous internal strife. Instead, the tribes have become a slowly
eroding facet of the current government, providing a much-needed conduit for infrastructure
development and contact with the population.
Oman’s Developmental Progress
All of these factors combined to ensure that economic development in Oman was not
at the sheer whim of a monarch, nor under the direct control of either tribal authorities or the
general population. However, this has not resulted in a confused policy, but rather a quite
impressively progressive one. Today, Oman has been rated as one of the most economically
free countries in the world. In the opinion of the Fraser Institute, in its Economic Freedom of
the World: 2005 Annual Report, “Oman has the seventeenth freest economy in the world, tied
with Finland.” 16 Alongside this economic development has come remarkable social and
political reform. Oman is one of the few remaining monarchies in the world where the
monarch retains the reigns of power. Despite his firm grip on the power structure of the
15
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Sultanate, Qaboos has worked tirelessly towards a more liberal process within his
government. The Sultan even wrote a constitution for his country and established a
representative body called the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council).
One must not confuse the fact that Oman has chosen to follow liberal economic
policies with the idea that Oman is currently a liberal state. Oman is indeed still ruled by an
absolute monarch. The Majlis al-Shura has no legislative powers beyond suggestion, and is
limited in the issues it can discuss. It is still a state where a citizen can be fined for having a
dirty automobile. Two of the most fundamental liberal rights, freedoms of speech and the
press, are viewed quite differently, and from a Western point of view, absent from Oman. To
maintain all of this, Oman has an extraordinarily effective police force that has the ability to
not only control dissent, but to dissuade further criminal actions by their sheer presence and
reputation. This effect is strengthened when combined with the governmental control of the
press. In effect, any public demonstrations are quickly shut down, and never make it to any
public news source.
This raises interesting questions about the motivations for Oman’s style of
development. It is commonly believed in the West that liberal economic policies are closely
tied to democratic political practices. Simply, liberal economic policies are viewed as being
good for the majority of the people, and so are naturally desirable to a government that
represents the people. Dictators and monarchs are historically more interested in their
personal welfare and therefore more commonly disposed to a form of economic development
that fills their own pockets first. So, why then has one of the last surviving true monarchies
chosen to pursue liberal economic policies so avidly?
On January 19th, 2006, Oman signed a Free Trade Agreement with the United States.
This was a major step forward for Oman’s liberal economic policies. Amazingly, the FTA
had been negotiated in only seven months, through only two formal rounds. As such, it is
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highly reflective of Oman’s goals and methods. A study of the process that Oman undertook
to decide that an FTA was appropriate, to prepare for the negotiations, and to ensure that the
negotiations were satisfactorily concluded would help shed light on the developmental
processes of a nation making the transition from isolation to the world stage.

C. Research Methods
The research that I conducted for this paper was divided into two segments. The first
of these was based on written materials, and the second was focused on personal, semistructured interviews with individuals in Oman. I began my research by examining the
concept of a Free Trade Agreement so that I could compare the Omani design to the
theoretical concept. I then read extensively on other similar FTA’s, especially the one
between Jordan and the United States. I feel that the Jordanian FTA is the closest in situation
to Oman’s because both countries have small populations, small economies, allied to the
United States in the “War on Terror”, and are, in their own ways, on the frontlines of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Admittedly, the Bahrain-US FTA would provide an even closer
comparison, but at this time there is not enough material about the Bahraini FTA to make it
feasible.
I also examined the available published information specific to the Oman-United
States FTA. Among these materials were opinion articles and general reporting done
throughout the FTA negotiation process. These articles helped to give impressions of the
public involvement and opinion of both the United States and Oman. At the same time I read
over the testimonies given before the Ways and Means Committee of the US House of
Representatives. The testimonies not only offered important positions and points, but they
revealed much of the process that America undergoes to pass an FTA. This has proved to be
an invaluable counterpoint to the process that I have observed in Oman.
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Following my inspection of the written material available, I commenced conducting
interviews. I began my interviews by speaking with several of the general Omani population.
Their interviews were valuable in giving me an idea of their level of knowledge on the
subject and whether or not they felt involved in the process. Following this, I conducted
interviews with as many of the top negotiators and players in the agreement proceedings as
time and opportunity would allow. Because of the high level of centralization in Oman, it is
essential to discuss motivations with the people whose personal motivations have the ability
to play a role in the overall situation.
Oman still does not recognize a right to free speech. Because of this, many Omani are
uncomfortable voicing their views to any beyond their family. The doubt that any comment
will be found as undesirable by the government is enough that it is preferable for them to
defer to those with the real or perceived expertise. Not only does this mean that much
discussion is restricted to the government line, but it is also difficult to access mid-level
government employees that might have important views to share.
Despite these difficulties, I made an effort to interview the elements of society that
would be involved in the United States. To this end, I pursued interviews with members of
the Majlis al-Shura Economic Committee, which is the closest Omani equivalent to the Ways
and Means Committee of the US House of Representatives. Likewise, I endeavored to
discuss the Agreement with members of the business community, especially those involved
or potentially involved in trade with the United States. This provides me with the equivalent
of the corporate testimonies presented before the Ways and Means Committee in the United
States.
The method for these interviews was semi-structured and very open-ended. I arrived
prepared with interview questions but allowed the interviewees to direct much of the
direction of the interview. Had I structured the interviews too strictly, the concern over
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answering ‘correctly’ would have drowned out any useful information about the motivations
and desires of the interviewees.

D. Analysis
In order to analyze the decision-making process behind the Free Trade Agreement,
and then the developmental processes that it reveals, one must approach each component
individually. As the United States initially proposed the FTA, it is appropriate to begin with
a peak at their motivations, although to thoroughly analyze them would require yet another
full research paper. Within Oman, one must identify how each societal group: the public,
press, government, and special-interest groups, played, or in some cases did not play, a role in
the decisions. Even within government itself, there is a distinction between the individual
motivations of influential persons and the general government strategy. By examining each
component, one can piece together a complete picture of the in’s and out’s of Oman’s
economic development.
America’s Motivation
The goals and expectations for the Oman-US Free Trade Agreement can be divided
into a pair of separate but unequal categories. The first of these and surprisingly less
important in this case, is the economic side. More meaningful to the majority of decisionmakers is the political side. This dichotomy is well recognized by the negotiating parties.
Ambassador Rob Portman, the US Trade Representative acknowledged both aspects during
the signing of the FTA by claiming, “With our signatures today, we cement our long-standing
friendship and growing commercial ties.” 17 While both aspects play a direct role in the
decision-making processes in both countries, their importance and method of discussion very
greatly between the two nations.
17
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The entire process was initiated by U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick’s
suggestion to the Omani government that each government examine the concept of a bilateral
Free Trade Agreement. For the American government, this was a continuation of the policy
conceived by President George W. Bush for “the effort to establish a Middle East Free Trade
Area by 2013.” 18 Because of this previously established doctrine, Oman was examined well
before it probably would have had it possessed a similar economy in a less strategically
important part of the world. This exemplifies the concept that, at least in American thinking,
the FTA is a political tool before it is an economic one.
In America, there are four main groups that take part in the decision-making process.
The first is, of course, the government itself. Second, the independent press serves as a
monitor for the government, informing the third and fourth parties of the government’s
actions and vice-versa. The third platform is the special-interest groups. Whether the
specific interest group is representing a concerned popularly based party such as the AFLCIO, or a group representing a corporation or group of related corporations such as the
National U.S.-Arab Chamber of Commerce, each group expresses the most distinct views on
any aspect. Finally, there is the public. While most often satisfied to leave their battles in the
hands of the first three, the American public can and sometimes do express their own
grievances, whether through public demonstrations or the ballot box. Recently, the
controversy over the corporate take-over of the control of several American ports by a Dubaibased company demonstrated the power of the American public on their government.
Oman’s Motivation
Oman, on the other hand, only fully uses two of these four decision-making
mechanisms. While the public and the press are acknowledged, the only true power is held in
interest groups (although still closely controlled by the government) and the government
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itself. The effect that this has on the decision-making process should be dramatic, if the
assumptions about the public role in liberal policy are correct.
Press
When one examines the economic data in the Omani press regarding the expectations
for the FTA, one immediately realizes that the FTA is entirely beneficial. That is, of course,
if one believes everything that one reads in the Omani press. To a young man who grew up
experiencing the influence of the American press corps, the so-called “fourth branch of
government” that is constantly battling within itself over whether even the smallest issue is
‘good or bad for America’, reading the Omani press has been eye-opening. There is an
obvious lack of critical analysis on the possible negative effects of the FTA.
Some would attempt to explain this as a natural by-product of Arab culture.
According to the well-renowned Sheik Khalfan, Arab culture is primarily built on
relationships. The process of establishing and maintaining those relationships is more
important than any concept of self. Therefore, newspapers do not publish articles critical of
individuals or the government for fear of publicly embarrassing those people and thereby
harming a delicately developed relationship. 19 However, this cultural aspect is reinforced by
the legal restrictions on the press that forbid such negative reporting. It is safe to say that the
press does not, and cannot, stand to make any critical comments of the government’s actions
in Oman and is therefore not a monitoring force as it is for the American government.
Representative Body
Similarly, the public is hindered by the same cultural deference and lacks freedom of
speech or assembly. This is slowly beginning to change, though. The Majlis al-Shura
(Consultative Council) was instituted with much celebration as a “representative body”
whose members are elected by the people. The implication here is that the Majlis should
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represent the opinions and serve as a conduit for the voice of the constituents, regardless of
how little power the body actually possesses. Unfortunately, this has not yet come to pass.
Talib Al Balooshi, a member of the Majlis, acknowledges this deficiency and goes on to
point out a further concern for the Omani public. The people “do not have full awareness…
[They] are still obsessed with domestic issues.” 20 Despite this fact, the Majlis was not
consulted at all concerning the Free Trade Agreement. There were no presentations in front
of the assembled body, no formal consultation of members in their role as such and no
discussion within the body about the FTA or its possible effects. Several members of the
Economic Committee, including Mr. Al Balooshi, were invited to attend a presentation about
the FTA at the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Even the presence at this meeting
was simply as observers.
Public
The average Omani citizen’s awareness of the Free Trade Agreement, or for that
matter, any government economic function, is severely limited. When speaking to Omani
men in the interior of the country, only approximately one in twenty men recognized the topic
enough to be willing to speak about it. A recent business graduate from Sultan Qaboos
University, Ahmed Al-Abri was an outstanding representation of the Omani public. He was,
at first, very uncomfortable speaking to me at all until repeatedly assured that I was not a
government agent of either Oman or the United States. Despite his education, his knowledge
of the subject was restricted only to what he had read in the newspapers, and his answers
followed those reports verbatim. When several of his colleagues expressed fears over smallbusiness being harmed by the Agreement, Mr. Al-Abri dismissed these doubts on the grounds
that the government would protect them. 21 He explained that what little concerns did make it
past the cultural and legal filter were generally expressed on Internet forums read mainly by
20
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other Omani. On these, doubts were raised, and concerns fleshed out, but “the government
doesn’t care about those.” 22 The voices online are too quiet to break through the pattern of
trust that has developed for the government.
This reliance on the government for protection and support is a major theme in the
daily life of the Omani population. For over three decades, a time period during which the
majority of the Omani population was born, the Omani people have reaped the benefits of the
rentier system. The government has ensured job security, pensions, basic needs,
infrastructure, and a host of other daily needs for the people. Because of this, the population
has slipped into a state of dependency on the state that is becoming distressing to all
involved. Omani children have been growing up with the knowledge that they will have
secure employment, and lacking this, monetary support nearly equaling employment. This
has created an overall lack of drive for individual, and therefore societal, betterment. The
lack of a fear of poverty has directly inhibited the Omani desire to compete. This, above any
other reason, explains the high population of low-wage foreign workers in Oman; they are
simply willing to do the jobs that the Omani see as below them. As well as the distressing
lack of personal motivation for economic gain, there is also a lack of desire to take part in
government functions. As far as the majority of Omani citizens are concerned, as long as
they have “jobs for their kids” 23 and financial security, there is no need to interfere in the
government’s work.
Perhaps the greatest loss from this public disinterest is the loss of potential advice.
While the great majority of private citizens are not economic, trade, or developmental
experts, they do have expertise in their own slice of life. If, at some point, a private citizen
were to have an idea, or reach a novel conclusion that could aid the government in its
business, they would have serious trouble sending their message to a decision-maker. While
22
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there is a system of communication from local government to the central power structure, it is
fairly impractical. The chances of a citizen’s suggestion, no matter how valid, finding its way
to someone who can act on it are slight. There is a process to submit papers suggesting
government reforms or actions, but it is poorly understood or even known about by the
general population. And without the right to publicly demonstrate, circumventing this system
is difficult when legal. Overall, public input does not play an influencing role in the
developmental strategy of Oman’s central government, and does not offer a check to any
possible government miscues.
Special Interest
The special interest community follows with the public to a degree. The government
to date strictly controls civil society. The application process for a society group, such as an
environmental interest group, is lengthy and requires close government cooperation and
scrutiny. Even the presence of civil society groups is relatively new to Oman, and still quite
slow to develop. Because of this, no civil society groups played any role in the creation of
the Free Trade Agreement.
Labor groups are an even more sensitive subject in Oman. The old Oman Labour
Law of 1973 expressly forbids labor collectivization and strikes or any other form of protest.
This law was updated in 2003 and now Oman allows “worker representative committees”
that are permitted to strike or bargain with industry leaders for improved working
environment. Eventually, this situation developed into the major stumbling block for the
ratification process of the FTA in the US Congress. Before Congress, the AFL-CIO, the
nation’s largest labor union, charged that
Oman’s labor laws are egregiously out of compliance with the ILO core labor
standards, and [they] are deeply concerned about the lack of fundamental
protections for Omani workers in both law and practice. 24
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The same Citizen’s Trade Campaign expressed the same concerns especially that Oman was
allowing for worker “exploitation…forced labor…human trafficking” 25 and other egregious
violations of the International Labor Organization (ILO) rules. These concerns have been
repeatedly expressed to decision-makers in the United States, resulting in the Democratic
Party making efforts to stall the ratification of the FTA by the US Congress. Importantly,
these types of concerns were never seriously raised before the decision-makers in Oman.
The worker representative committees in Oman did not play a role in the Free Trade
Agreement process. Accordingly, the voice of the general Omani labor was not broadcast on
an issue that will directly affect it. Rather, the central government judged that it knew what
was better for the labor force than the committees designed to represent just that. Indeed it is
highly questionable whether or not input from the current worker representative committees
would be useful as the government and the business elite closely controls them. Whether or
not the government did indeed set the best course for the future of Omani labor will only be
told by the test of time.
In fact, the private sector as a whole played a minimal role. Within Oman, the
interaction between the government and the business community at large during the FTA
process was limited to a series of presentations at the Oman Center for Import Production and
Export Development (OCIPED) and the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI).
While these meetings were officially open to the public, they were not well publicized and
“mainly only business and industry leaders” 26 attended at all according to OCIPED Executive
President Eng. Salem Ben Nasser Al Ismaily. Actually, these meetings were not so much
about considering the opinions of the business community, as addressing any concerns and
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convincing them of the good sense behind the FTA. 27 It is generally understood that any
serious interaction between the business elite and the government decision-makers takes
place behind closed-doors well before any public discussion is permitted.
Government Individuals
So, while the publics concerns were ignored or not expressed, the newspapers kept
silent, civil society and labor groups restricted, and the business community limited to elite
interactions, what was the motivation of the government throughout? The preparation and
negotiation of the FTA was the shared responsibility of the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry and OCIPED. Within these organizations, two men directed the efforts: at OCIPED
by Eng. Salem Al Ismaily, and at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry by Dr. Said AlRiyami. Each of these men was able to assert a good deal of individual influence on the
decision-making process and their own motivations are highly reflective of the expressed
government desires. It was my privilege to formally interview and informally discuss the
FTA process with both gentlemen.
Eng. Salem Al Ismaily is a true believer in liberal economic theory. He speaks
fluently and confidently about the benefits of specialization and international trade systems.
His actions and rationalizations are firmly rooted in the long-term view that can rarely be
achieved without the benefit of a solid education in theoretical economics. As well, he
carries himself with the confidence of a self-made man. Dr. Said Al-Riyami is of a similar
mind. He, also, enjoys the benefits of a foreign-based theoretical economics education.
Together, these two men led the government process with a purist economic view of the longterm benefits of free trade.
When questioned directly about the reasons for the Free Trade Agreement’s
remarkably rapid progress through the negotiating phase, both men immediately credited

27

Ibid.

24

Oman’s preparation for the process. The major factor was Oman’s recent accession to the
World Trade Organization, successfully completed in 2000. As opposed to the older
members of the WTO, “before [Oman] could get into the WTO [they] had to deal with a lot
of issues…until we got it right, only then would the US vote for membership.” 28 Along these
lines, Oman had to make great efforts to liberalize its economy, notably along lines partially
dictated by the United States; well before FTA negotiations were even proposed. The result
of this is that Oman only needed to travel a “short road” 29 to further adjust to the demands of
an American FTA. The most important example of this is in the level of Omani tariffs. The
average Omani tariff on US products is currently approximately 5% (with the exception of
textiles and several other goods). Dropping tariffs from 5% to 0% is a small enough change
that it does not cause large adjustment effects to the economy. As put by Dr. Al-Riyami,
If a consumer is trying to decide between an American car and a Japanese car,
the 5% change might push them one way or another if they are on the edge,
but it is not big enough to change their minds if they simply want a Japanese
car. 30
This also means that the costs of adjustment for the government offices responsible were
quite low.
Together, Dr. Al-Riyami and Eng. Al Ismaily, along with various other high-ranking
members of the Omani government provided a core of idealistic economic theory. Over
years of work, they have already made efforts to push Oman along this economically liberal
path, with the support of the monarch. When the proposal for a Free Trade Agreement with
the United States was received, these individuals were ready and willing to implement their
ideologies. All it took was the go-ahead from the government that this was indeed the correct
path for Oman to pursue.
General Government
28

Ibid.
Riyami, Dr. Said Amer Sultan Al-. Personal Interview. April 23, 2006.
30
Ibid.
29

25

Another aspect to the preparation took place after the US Trade Representative,
Robert Zoellick, proposed FTA negotiations on November 15, 2004. Rather than debate
within the government whether an FTA was appropriate or not, the central authorities within
the Omani government quickly decided that the FTA was a goal worth pursuing, and that
pursuit began immediately. Oman sent government researchers to Jordan, Bahrain, and
Morocco (the other three Arab governments to have signed FTA’s with the United States) to
examine exactly what processes their negotiations with the US had involved. They
researched each American demand and expectation, as well as what responses had or had not
worked for the Arab governments. In essence, they “just did [their] homework” 31 and were
able to prepare answers to the questions that would be posed by the US negotiators.
It is also interesting to note the history of trade negotiations that Oman possesses.
Over centuries as a sea-faring, commercial power, Oman developed a high regard for
dialogue and those members of society who possess the ability to negotiate well. Negotiation
is a part of everyday Omani life, with very few prices actually fixed. Even well established
sellers make it normal practice to offer ‘discounts’ or haggling. On a grander scale, this
history of negotiation has played well in the favor of Oman. They were the first nation on the
Arabian Peninsula to successfully negotiate border agreements with each of their neighbors,
no small feat considering the borders they share with such prickly governments as Yemen,
Saudi Arabia and Iran. At the FTA negotiations, this experience translated into a smooth,
professional dialogue. Having just left the less organized United Arab Emirates, the
American trade negotiators were impressed by the Omani team, whom they described as
“tough negotiators.” 32 This professionalism directly increased the pace of negotiation on its
own.
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The concept of pace is very familiar to the current Omani regime. Throughout each
aspect of Omani development since the accession of Sultan Qaboos in 1970 there has been an
emphasis placed on steady, deliberate reform. Every discussion of reform in Oman is
deferred to the Sultan’s patience and timing. The Majlis Al-Shura is itself the third
incarnation of a representative body in Oman. Each body has successively moved closer to a
truly democratic ideal. Amazingly, the people of Oman are overwhelmingly patient and
compliant with what may seem to an outsider to be an aggravatingly slow process. In fact,
this issue has developed within the FTA negotiations. American demands that Oman alter its
labor law ignore the fact that three years ago Oman changed the law that had previously stood
untouched for ten times as long. There is a general feeling that “America is trying to pressure
the natural evolution of labor laws” 33 in Oman. The Omani government takes a great deal of
pride in the success of their own established pace, and is wary of any efforts to interfere with
it.
Here one finds the single largest key to understanding the Omani regime, and their
method of economic liberalization, pride. For the past 36 years, Oman has resurrected itself
through a self-proclaimed renaissance. As stated by His Majesty Qaboos Bin Said,
The success of the human experience is the result of constant endeavour,
commitment, will and a sense of responsibility. No nation can realize its goals
unless its people work together to build its future and develop its potential. 34
Stemming from this pride is the sense that the only entity that knows what is truly best for
Oman is Oman itself. Sultan Qaboos, the embodiment of the Omani spirit, is therefore seen
as the ultimate critic and solution to the nation’s difficulties. While negotiation and dialogue
are vital to survival, decisions about Oman should originate within Oman.
Beneath the surface of this patriotism is an undercurrent found throughout the world’s
political systems, especially those of the Middle East. This is the desire of the reigning
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regime to retain their power. No other region of the world has as strong of a tradition of
regime-maintenance as the Middle East. Through crises and celebrations, Arab power
structures are remarkably resilient. Oman is a shining example of this, where the Al-Bu Saidi
family has maintained sovereign control for three centuries. Sultan Qaboos is no exception to
this rule. In fact, through careful manipulation and low levels of corruption, the Sultan has
managed to increase his power base while many neighboring regimes struggle against
popular discontent.
The Free Trade Agreement, beyond any economic benefits, provides Sultan Qaboos
with another accomplishment to add to his list of successes. Towards his own people, the
FTA signals that Oman has been recognized as an equal partner to the largest power in the
world. The prestige from this “signals safety for foreign direct investment” 35 and has already
caught the attention of Yemeni and Indian business interested in using it to their advantage
(with Oman reaping the middle-man benefits). 36 In fact, part of the rush to push the FTA
through was based on the Omani desire to be recognized not only as having such an
agreement, but as being one of the first in the region to do so. Simultaneously, it shows the
Omani public that Qaboos has, indeed, succeeded at modernizing their country to a level
recognizable by world powers. Also, the FTA is likely to help produce new jobs in Oman,
though the level to which this will occur is highly debatable. Regardless, the government is
touting this feature because it knows that job creation is among the population’s largest
concerns. Addressing it so boldly exudes a confidence and progressive determination that
restrained peoples respond to positively.
Conclusion
It was this realization of the political benefits that settled the decision to pursue the
Free Trade Agreement for the government of Oman. The economic benefits were well
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recognized and explained by the responsible government officials, but the addition of another
highlight to Sultan Qaboos’ ruling resume sealed the deal. Because of this, when Robert
Zoellick approached Oman with the proposal to begin consideration, work progressed
rapidly. In the absence of any distractions or disputes of their decision (such as a free press
or active public), the initial choice of the government to go ahead with negotiations remained
unhindered throughout both the planning and negotiation process. With the clear order to
progress having been issued, the practiced skill of Omani negotiators, paired with the already
highly liberalized economy, greased the negotiation’s wheels. The inevitable result was the
lightning fast progress of the entire Omani side of negotiations.
E. Lessons
There are definite lessons to be learned from examining the process by which Oman
prepared itself and undertook the acquisition of a Free Trade Agreement with the United
States. For the United States, the message that may be taken is contrary to current policy.
Oman is a successful, competitive nation that is quite obviously on the road to a liberal,
possibly one day even being a fully democratic nation, if the Sultan’s vision plays out. They
have set their own course, and through careful, patient maneuvering, continued towards a
goal that mirrors the American vision for an ideal partner. However, all of this has proceeded
under a repressive regime that continues to deny what Americans consider ‘basic’ human
rights. As America continues to try to bully its way through the Middle East and force
countries into becoming democracies, Oman provides a better solution. Indeed, the path to a
successful country is not through American democratic-republicanism, it is through wise
governance. America would be better served to promote good governance, and worry less
about the exact form of that governance.
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There is a lesson to be found for Oman as well. Currently, the country can best be
described as “a planned economy run by MBA’s.” 37 Planned economies have historically
proved to be impractical and prone to errors. “The government is currently the sole
representative for the public and private sectors” 38 and this will lead to issues unless the
market is allowed to self-correct without government interference. Likewise, politically,
Oman’s government must allow a monitor to develop. The American system of checks and
balances, as well as the input of the free media, helps to guard against fatal errors. The
Omani system, regardless of its recent history of successes, is too centralized to possibly
correct for mistakes in judgment until it is too late. The practice of using experts and
including opponents has been wise, but eventually it will fail. Allowing a freer press or a
representative body with the right to oversee government decisions would help insulate Oman
against human errors.
For the developing countries at large, Oman does provide good concepts that ought to
be developed, but cannot be a true general model for development. The major factors that
Oman possesses, a benevolent, secure leader and a patient, trusting populous, are simply not
easily developed. However, Oman’s practices of inclusion and dialogue would serve many
developing nations well. The idea of measured development and liberalization can also help
to guard against the economic shocks that accompany rapid economic opening.
F. Further Research
As with any study, there is more to be found. Of course, even greater access to other
key players (ministers, the Sultan, the broader business community, etc.) would be valuable
toward the exact same research line. After a period of time, it would be highly beneficial to
examine the direct results of the Free Trade Agreement and how the economic theories
behind it have played out. It would also be worthwhile to examine other aspects of Omani
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economic relations such as: GCC relations, the Indian Ocean Rim Preferential Trading
Agreement, the Oman Audit Program, Oman’s expressed desire to be the economically freest
nation in the world, and many more. In-depth character studies of the key players within
Oman are lacking as well. The possibilities for further studying are as rapidly expanding as
the political and economic realms of Oman itself.
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